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I. INTRODUCTION 
To what extent can Congress deprive noncitizens of access to judicial 
review to challenge government actions that harm them? 
To avoid removal from the United States, a noncitizen, who is 
typically unrepresented and lacks understanding of our immigration laws 
is required to go through a rigorous administrative process before a federal 
judge will review his case and ultimately decide his fate.  The stakes are 
especially high for noncitizens who escaped violence in their homelands.  
Often, due to the lack of guidance from Congress and the federal courts, 
noncitizens are deprived of their right to seek federal judicial review and 
are ultimately removed to unsafe countries. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),1 provides the basic 
framework for current U.S. immigration law.  The INA covers 
immigration quotas, entry, exclusion, deportation proceedings, visa 
issuance and inspection, and the legal relief available to those facing 
deportation.2   Under the INA, noncitizens3 may petition for judicial 
review4 of an adverse decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“Board” or “BIA”) as long as that decision constitutes a final order of 
removal.5  But nowhere in the INA is the relevant phrase “final order of 
removal” clearly defined.6  Instead, “terminology concerning finality is 
                                                                                                             
 1 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22 U.S.C.). 
 2 Richard D. Steel, Steel on Immigration Law § 1:2 (2014). 
 3 The INA defines the term “alien” as “any person not a citizen or national of the 
United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).  For simplicity and to advance social equality, the 
non-derogatory term “noncitizen” will be used throughout this Comment. 
 4 The principal vehicle for judicial review is a “petition for review,” which must be 
filed in the circuit in which the removal hearing was held.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). 
 5 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1), (a)(5).  However, there are also restrictions on judicial 
review for people removable on criminal grounds.  § 1252(a)(2)(C) (“no court shall have 
jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by 
reason of having committed a criminal offense . . . .”). 
 6 The courts have linked the term “order of removal” to the INA’s definition of a final 
order of deportation.  Thus, an “order of removal” refers to the administrative order 
concluding that the noncitizen is removable or ordering removal. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(47)(A). 
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spread throughout both the statute and regulations, leaving ample room for 
courts to construct their own views on whether or when certain Board 
decisions become final for purposes of judicial review.”7 
As to the existence of an “order,” the INA provides that immigration 
judges will decide cases and, if necessary, order removal at the conclusion 
of the proceedings.8  The regulation defines the “order of the immigration 
judge” as one that “direct[s] the respondent’s removal from the United 
States, or the termination of the proceedings, or other such disposition of 
the case.”9  As the Board has observed, “the regulations contemplate that 
an Immigration Judge will enter an order that leads to a final conclusion 
of the removal proceedings.”10  Once there is an order of removal, the INA 
provides two conditions upon which the order becomes final: (1) when the 
Board affirms it; or (2) when the time to appeal the order to the Board 
expires.11 
After the order by the immigration judge becomes final, the 
noncitizen may file a petition for review with the court of appeals for their 
geographic location.12  On petition for review, “whether from the 
immigration judge’s or the Board’s decision, the other requirements of 8 
U.S.C. § 1252 must be met, including the timely filing of the petition for 
review from the final order of removal and the noncitizen’s exhaustion of 
all administrative remedies.”13  Generally, the thirty-day statutory filing 
deadline to obtain judicial review by the court of appeals begins to run 
when the Board issues a decision that affirms the immigration judge’s 
removal order in its entirety.14  In some cases, however, noncitizens seek 
multiple forms of relief from removal in a single proceeding, leading to 
confusion regarding finality.  In such a case, the Board may uphold part of 
                                                                                                             
 7 Jesi J. Carlson et al., Finality and Judicial Review Under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act: A Jurisprudential Review and Proposal for Reform, 49 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 635, 637 (2016). 
 8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A). 
 9 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(c). 
 10 In re I-S-& C-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 432, 433 (B.I.A. 2008) (“Since the regulations 
require entry of an order that will result in the conclusion of proceedings, a grant of 
voluntary departure without an alternate order of deportation is improper because it leaves 
the proceedings unresolved and incomplete” (citing In re Chamizo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 435 
(B.I.A. 1969); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A)). 
 11 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). 
 12 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1). 
 13 Jesi J. Carlson et al., Finality and Judicial Review Under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act: A Jurisprudential Review and Proposal for Reform, 49 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 635, 650 (2016) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(1), 1252 (d)(1)). 
 14 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1), 1252(b)(1). 
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a removal order but remand to the immigration judge for further 
proceedings.15 
For instance, in Singh v. Lynch, the BIA denied the noncitizen’s 
asylum request, but remanded his case to an immigration judge for further 
proceedings.16  Singh waited until post-remand proceedings were 
complete before timely filing a petition for review from the order of 
removal that finally concluded his removal proceedings.17  The Ninth 
Circuit dismissed Singh’s petition, however, holding that the BIA’s earlier 
remand order was the “final order of removal” from which Singh had only 
30 days to petition for review.18  As a result, the Ninth Circuit refused to 
hear the merits of Singh’s claim.19  Singh’s case depicts the confusion and 
conflicts that exist among the circuits due to the lack of a bright-line rule 
for finality.  The confusion regarding what constitutes the “final order of 
removal” for purposes of judicial review often results in noncitizens losing 
their ability to challenge the denial of relief from removal.20 
Currently, the circuit courts are split on whether courts of appeals 
have jurisdiction to review a noncitizen’s premature appeal.  The Second, 
Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held that circuit courts have 
jurisdiction over premature appeals when the subsequent agency action 
becomes final.21  On the other hand, the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits 
held that courts of appeals do not have jurisdiction if the appeal is 
premature and that later events cannot cure the defect.22  The inter-circuit 
                                                                                                             
 15 Carlson, supra note 7, at 636 (“When that occurs, some forms of relief might be 
granted, while others are denied or require a remand to the immigration judge for further 
proceedings.  This hybrid ‘mixed’ decision often leaves aliens and attorneys wondering 
when the removal order becomes final, and thus when they should file a petition for review.  
When the Board issues its decision? Or at the conclusion of the remanded proceedings? 
Which order constitutes the ‘final order of removal’ for purposes of judicial review?”). 
 16 Singh v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 880, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 17 Id. at 882. 
 18 Id. at 883. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Over 40% of noncitizens are not represented by counsel during removal 
proceedings.  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, FY 
2015 Statistics Yearbook (April 2016). 
 21 See Herrera-Molina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a 
premature petition for review “can become a reviewable final order upon the adjudication 
of remaining applications for relief and protection, provided that the Attorney General has 
not shown prejudice”); Mohammed Shuaib Khan v. United States Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 
488, 494 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that if the “Attorney General has not shown that he will 
suffer prejudice resulting from the premature filing of a petition for review,” “a premature 
petition for review can ripen once the BIA issues a final order”); Jimenez-Morales v. 
United States Att’y Gen., 821 F.3d 1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the 
noncitizen’s petition ripened when the immigration judge found that the noncitizen “did 
not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture”). 
 22 See Moreira v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 709 (5th Cir. 2007); Jaber v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 
223 (6th Cir. 2007). 
2017] Crossing the Judicial Border 189 
conflicts regarding the issue of finality, and under what circumstances a 
Board decision may be deemed final for purposes of judicial review breed 
confusion; a petition for review that is deemed timely in one circuit may 
be considered premature or untimely in a different circuit. 
Consequently, noncitizens will lose their opportunity to seek judicial 
review of the agency’s disposition of their claims.23  The ambiguity as to 
when a petition for review should be filed results in noncitizens filing too 
late or too early, thereby risking the dismissal of their petitions.  For 
instance, noncitizens who file multiple petitions to avoid removal may find 
those petitions dismissed as premature if the agency has yet to issue a final 
decision.  Conversely, if the petition for review is late because the 
noncitizen missed the mandatory filing deadline, he has lost his ability to 
seek judicial review of the agency decision and will be removed from the 
United States.  This result is unfair to noncitizens, who are often not 
represented by counsel, especially where the late filing is due to 
contradictory circuit court precedent on finality rather than a mistake on 
the part of the noncitizen.  Furthermore, this uncertainty can result in the 
inefficient and unjust operation of immigration law by stalling judicial 
review by the appropriate court of appeals. 
This Comment seeks to clarify the circuit split regarding judicial 
review of premature petitions and address the inconsistencies amongst the 
courts of appeals.  This Comment proceeds in four parts.  Part I outlines 
the history of appeals and judicial review under the INA.  Part II provides 
an overview of the current circuit split on the availability of judicial review 
for a noncitizen’s premature petition for review.  Part III criticizes the 
limited availability of judicial review in the immigration context.  Lastly, 
Part IV proposes an expansion of judicial review in immigration 
proceedings to provide noncitizens with due process and a fair opportunity 
to be heard by an impartial decision maker. This Comment argues that the 
rule applied by the Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, allowing 
a noncitizen’s premature petition for review to ripen into a reviewable 
order if there is no prejudice to the adverse party, promotes fairness and 
advances principles of due process.24 
II. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER 
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 
The INA provides that the federal courts of appeals are the “sole and 
exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal.”25  As such, a 
                                                                                                             
 23 Carlson, supra note 7, at 637. 
 24 See Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d 128, Khan, 691 F.3d 488, and Jimenez-Morales, 821 
F.3d 1307. 
 25 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). 
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noncitizen may seek judicial review of an adverse decision only when the 
relevant order becomes final.26 
The INA synonymously describes an order of removal in two parts: 
(1) an order of the immigration judge or administrative officer that (2) 
either concludes deportability or orders deportation.27  The regulation 
defines the “order of the immigration judge” as one that “direct[s] the 
respondent’s removal from the United States, or the termination of the 
proceedings, or other such disposition of the case as may be appropriate.”28 
The INA does not clearly define “final order of removal,” and thus 
courts construct their own views on whether and when certain immigration 
judge or Board decisions become final for purposes of judicial review.  
Under the INA, a noncitizen must seek judicial review of the final order 
of removal within thirty days, and this filing deadline is mandatory and 
jurisdictional.29  A noncitizen who files his petition for review after a 
decision is deemed non-final risks having the petition dismissed for lack 
of jurisdiction.  If the noncitizen then fails to file a petition for review 
within thirty days of the actual final agency order, his petition will be 
deemed late and he will be barred from bringing an appeal.30  Additionally, 
if the “premature” petition is adjudicated at the expiration of the thirty 
days, the noncitizen will also be left with no recourse.  Noncitizens are 
often unable to gain access to judicial review because of the confusion 
regarding the existence of a final order of removal and the rigid filing 
deadline for appeals. 
A. Appeal Procedure 
Initially, a Notice to Appear is filed in the immigration court 
charging the noncitizen with a violation of law.31  Thereafter, various 
hearings are scheduled before the immigration judge and the noncitizen 
has the opportunity to contest the charges and pursue appropriate forms of 
relief under the INA.32  At the conclusion of the hearings, the immigration 
judge will issue a decision.33  The parties may then file an administrative 
appeal with the Board within thirty days of the immigration judge’s 
                                                                                                             
 26 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 
 27 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A). 
 28 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12. 
 29 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (“The petition for review must be filed not later than 30 
days after the date of the final order of removal.”); Magtanong v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 1190, 
1191 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The provision establishing the thirty-day filing period is mandatory 
and jurisdictional.”) (citing Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995)). 
 30 Id. 
 31 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a). 
 32 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). 
 33 8 C.F.R. § 1003.37. 
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decision.34  As a last resort, a noncitizen may seek judicial review of the 
Board’s final order in the federal court of appeals.35 
The general grant of appellate jurisdiction found in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1) establishes “judicial review of a final order of removal.”36  
An order of removal becomes final when the Board affirms the 
immigration judge’s finding of removability or when the time for 
appealing the immigration judge’s decision has expired.37  Circuit courts 
“may review a final order of removal only if the [noncitizen] has exhausted 
all administrative remedies.”38  However, the statute divests the courts of 
jurisdiction over claims by noncitizens with criminal convictions.39  
Additionally, under the INA, the Attorney General may use his discretion 
in granting various forms of relief from removal; the denial of such 
discretionary relief is not subject to judicial review.40 
If the petition for review overcomes the procedural barriers, the 
federal court of appeals reviewing the case will base its decision on the 
merits of the petition for review solely on the administrative record.41  The 
administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless a “reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”42 
B. Meaning of “Finality” in the INA 
Finality dictates whether or when a noncitizen may seek judicial 
review of agency action under the relevant provisions of the INA.  The 
INA contains only indirect references to the finality requirement;43 
                                                                                                             
 34 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.3(a)(1), 1003.38(a)-(b). 
 35 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(A). 
 36 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 
 37 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). 
 38 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (d)(1) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if (1) the 
alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”). 
 39 8 U.S.C.S. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (“no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final 
order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a 
criminal offense covered in section 212(a)(2) or 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) [8 USCS 
§ 1182(a)(2) or 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D)], or any offense covered by section 
237(a)(2)(A)(ii) [8 USCS § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)] for which both predicate offenses are, 
without regard to their date of commission, otherwise covered by section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) 
[8 USCS § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)].”). 
 40 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). 
 41 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). 
 42 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 
 43 Section 242(a)(1) of the INA provides that “judicial review of a final order of 
removal  . . .  is governed only by chapter 158 of Title 28, except as provided in subsection 
(b) of this section and except that the court may not order the taking of additional evidence 
under section 2347 of such title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); see 8 U.S.C. §§1252(a)-(g) 
(providing, with limited exceptions, that a petition for review in the courts of appeals is the 
sole and exclusive means for judicial review of a final order of removal). In turn, chapter 
158 of Title 28, which relates to judicial review of federal agency orders, more expressly 
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however, its provisions authorizing judicial review of orders of removal 
have universally been understood to contain a finality requirement for 
federal court jurisdiction.44  In part, this is because administrative law 
recognizes a strong presumption “that judicial review will be available 
only when agency action becomes final.”45 
The INA requires that an agency order be “final” for judicial review 
to be available, however, it does not define or state when an order of 
removal becomes final. 46  Such ambiguity has resulted in uncertainty as 
                                                                                                             
alludes to the finality requirement. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2344; see also 28 U.S.C. §§2342, 
2349 (stating that the courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review “final orders” of the 
relevant agencies and providing that the filing of a petition for review “does not itself stay 
or suspend the operation of the order of the agency”). In addition to the section authorizing 
judicial review, the INA refers to final orders of removal in other sections as well, using 
finality to describe a condition or serve as a reference point. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 
§§1182(a)(6)(F), 1182(d)(3)(B), 1227(d)(1), 1228(b)(4)(F), 1229a(b)(7), 1229a(c)(6)-(7), 
1231(a)(1), 1253(a)(1). The implementing regulations similarly refer to final and finality 
throughout their provisions. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§1.2, 210.4, 214.11(d)(9), 214.14(c)(1)(ii), 
216.5(a)(2), 236.1(c)(1), 236.8(a)(4), 245a.12(b)(3), 245a.13(f), 245a.18(c)(1), 
245.20(a)(1), (e), 274a.12(c)(18), 1001.1(p), 1003.23(b), 1208.18(b)(2), 1241.1, 1241.31. 
 44 See, e.g., Lopez-Ruiz v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissing 
petition for review because “the BIA’s granting of the motion to reopen means there is no 
longer a final decision to review.”); Gafurova v. Holder, 448 F. App’x 139, 140 (2d Cir. 
2011) (“The BIA granted [the noncitizen’s] motion to reopen and remanded her case to an 
immigration judge for further proceedings and entry of a new decision. Accordingly, there 
is no longer a final order of removal against her over which [the court] may exercise 
jurisdiction, and [the court] dismiss[es] the petition for review.”); Satheeskumar v. United 
States Att’y Gen., 557 F. App’x 128, 130 n.2 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[The order of removal] was 
rendered non-final when the BIA granted [the noncitizen’s] motion to reopen.”); Sanchez-
Naranjo v. Holder, 510 F. App’x 759, 760 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen, as here, the BIA 
reopens a previously concluded removal proceeding and remands for a new decision by the 
immigration judge, the prerequisite for circuit court jurisdiction ceases to exist and any 
pending petition for review must be dismissed.”); Suharti v. United States Att’y Gen., 349 
F. App’x 443, 450 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Absent language explicitly upholding a final order of 
removal, the BIA’s sua sponte reopening of proceedings removes the finality of the 
removal order and [the court’s] jurisdiction to review it.”); see also Castaneda-Castillo v. 
Holder, 638 F.3d 354, 360 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that the Board’s reopening of the case 
“would have meant that there would be no final agency determination for [the court] to 
review, and so [the court] would no longer have had jurisdiction over the case”). 
 45 Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 (1983). In the administrative context, even if 
the relevant statute does not expressly require a “final order” for judicial review, the 
Supreme Court has stated that there is a “strong presumption . . . that judicial review will 
be available only when agency action becomes final.” Id.; see McKart v. United States, 
395 U.S. 185, 193–95 (1969) (referring to exhaustion principles to explain necessity of 
finality rule); Charles Alan Wright et al., 16 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3942 (3d ed. 
2012) (discussing the requirement and reasons for finality in federal court review of 
administrative decisions). 
 46 “The petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the 
final order of removal.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).  This filing requirement is “indeed 
jurisdictional in nature,” Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 118 (2d Cir. 2008), and 
thus courts have “no authority to create equitable exceptions” to the thirty-day filing 
deadline, Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). 
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to when a petition for review may be filed and ultimately the loss of the 
noncitizen’s opportunity for judicial review.47 
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT 
While the Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the lingering 
question of whether premature petitions for review may ripen into 
petitions over which the courts of appeals have jurisdiction, the circuit 
courts have decided the question.  The circuit courts are split on whether 
and when certain orders become final for purposes of judicial review.  This 
Section will review how the courts of appeals have considered the issue of 
whether a premature petition for review may “ripen” into a timely petition 
for review once the agency has concluded all relevant administrative 
proceedings.  Under one approach, if a petition for review is late, the 
noncitizen has lost his ability to seek judicial review because the filing 
deadline is mandatory and jurisdictional, and, thus, not susceptible to 
tolling or any other equitable exception.48  On the other hand, if the petition 
for review is premature (i.e., the noncitizen has filed the petition prior to 
the agency’s order obtaining the requisite degree of finality for review 
purposes), there is a possibility that a circuit court will hold that the 
petition ripens upon the completion of all agency proceedings, negating 
any need to file a second, timely petition for review.49 
The courts of appeals are divided as to whether, and under what 
circumstances, they have jurisdiction to review a noncitizen’s premature 
appeal.  The Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held that circuit 
courts have jurisdiction over premature appeals when the 
subsequent agency action becomes final.50  The Fifth, Sixth and Ninth 
                                                                                                             
 47 See Batubara v. Holder, 733 F.3d 1040, 1042–43 (10th Cir. 2013) (dismissing 
petition for review because the petitioner, who waited until administrative proceedings 
were completed, failed to file a timely petition for review of the Board’s order remanding 
the case to the immigration judge for further proceedings). 
 48 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (“The petition for review must be filed not later than 30 
days after the date of the final order of removal.”); Magtanong v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 1190, 
1191 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The provision establishing the thirty-day filing period is mandatory 
and jurisdictional.”) (citing Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995)). 
 49 See Herrera-Molina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2010); Mohammed Shuaib 
Khan v. United States Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2012); Jimenez-Morales v. United 
States Att’y Gen., 821 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 50 See Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d at 132 (holding that a premature petition for review 
“can become a reviewable final order upon the adjudication of remaining applications for 
relief and protection, provided that the Attorney General has not shown prejudice”); Khan, 
691 F.3d at 494 (holding that if “the Attorney General has not shown that he will suffer 
prejudice resulting from the premature filing of a petition for review,” “a premature petition 
for review can ripen once the BIA issues a final order”); Jimenez-Morales, 821 F.3d at 
1308 (holding that the noncitizen’s petition ripened when the immigration judge found that 
the noncitizen “did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture”). 
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Circuits held that circuit courts do not have jurisdiction if the appeal is 
premature and that later events cannot cure the defect.51 
A. Circuits Where a Premature Petition for Review May Ripen for 
Purposes of Judicial Review 
i. Second Circuit 
In Herrera-Molina v. Holder, decided in 2010, the noncitizen sought 
review of a “decision of the United States Department of Homeland 
Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement reinstating a prior order 
of deportation for illegal entry, entered in July 1985” against the 
noncitizen.52  Mr. Herrera-Molina, a citizen of Colombia, illegally entered 
the United States in 1972 and was deported in 1985.53  Thereafter, Mr. 
Herrera-Molina reentered the United States without inspection and started 
a family.54  In 1995, Mr. Herrera-Molina’s spouse became a naturalized 
United States citizen, and in 1997, she “filed on behalf of Mr. Herrera-
Molina a Petition for Alien Relative (“Form I-130”) and an Application to 
Adjust Status (“Form I-485”).”55  In 2003, Mr. Herrera-Molina “filed an 
Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United 
States after Deportation or Removal (“Form I-212”), which was denied.”56  
Thereafter, in 2007, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 
reinstated his prior order of deportation and placed him in custody.57 
After Mr. Herrera-Molina indicated that he feared for his life, an 
asylum officer interviewed him and issued a Reasonable Fear 
Determination, finding that “he had a reasonable fear of returning to 
Colombia” and that he should be allowed to pursue his “withholding of 
removal claim before an immigration judge.”58  Mr. Herrera-Molina was 
then “placed in withholding of removal proceedings before an 
immigration judge, and on November 8, 2007, the immigration judge 
denied his application for withholding of removal.”59  Mr. Herrera-Molina 
“appealed the immigration judge’s decision to the BIA” and in July 2009, 
                                                                                                             
 51 See Moreira v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 709 (5th Cir. 2007); Jaber v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 
223 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 52 Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d 128, 130. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 131. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 130. 
 58 Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d at 131. 
 59 Id. 
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the BIA dismissed the appeal.60  Subsequently, Mr. Herrera-Molina filed 
a petition for review with the Second Circuit.61 
The Second Circuit began its analysis by determining whether it had 
jurisdiction over the case because, “at the time that the parties filed their 
briefs,” Mr. Herrera-Molina’s appeal of the immigration judge’s initial 
“denial of withholding of removal was still pending before the BIA.”62  
However, after the BIA dismissed Mr. Herrera-Molina’s appeal of the 
denial of withholding of removal, the Attorney General conceded that the 
petition for review ripened from a premature petition into a petition for 
review of a final order of removal.63 
The court held that “a premature petition for review of a not-yet-final 
order of removal can become a reviewable final order upon the 
adjudication of remaining applications for relief and protection, provided 
that the Attorney General has not shown prejudice.”64  The court found 
that when the BIA rendered a decision resolving Mr. Herrera-Molina’s 
appeal and the Attorney General did not claim that he was prejudiced by 
Mr. Herrera-Molina “filing a petition for review prior to the BIA’s 
decision,” the noncitizen’s petition became reviewable.65 
ii. Third Circuit 
In Khan v. United States Att’y Gen., decided in 2012, the United 
States Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated removal 
proceedings after the petitioners, a father and his son, overstayed their 
visas.66  The petitioners sought asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”),67 alleging that 
the father had been “persecuted in Pakistan based on his membership in 
                                                                                                             
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 132. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d at 132 (citing Lewis v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 125, 128–29 
(2d Cir. 2007)); Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Despite his premature 
petition to us, we exercised jurisdiction noting that the BIA has since affirmed petitioner’s 
removal order and the respondent has not shown prejudice.”). 
 65 Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d at 132 (“Accordingly, even if Herrera-Molina’s initial 
petition were premature, we conclude that the reinstatement of his prior deportation order 
is now a reviewable final order and proceed to the merits of his arguments.”). 
 66 Khan v. United States Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 67 Article III of the CAT provides that a state may not remove a person to another 
nation if there are “substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture” in that nation.  FARRA § 2242.  The United States has signed, ratified, 
and codified CAT.  “It [is] the policy of the United States not to expel . . . or otherwise 
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial 
grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture . . . .”  
FARRA § 2242(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231). 
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the Pakistan People’s Party.”68  Before the BIA decided the petitioners’ 
motion for an emergency stay of removal and a motion to reopen their 
case, the petitioners prematurely filed a petition for review with the Third 
Circuit “challenging the BIA’s alleged refusal to adjudicate their motion 
for an emergency stay of removal and motion to reopen.”69  The Attorney 
General moved to dismiss the petition arguing that the petition was “(1) 
untimely with respect to the BIA’s February 2003 decision and (2) 
premature with respect to the BIA’s anticipated decision on the 
petitioners’ motion for an emergency stay of removal and motion to 
reopen.”70  The BIA ultimately denied the petitioners’ motion to reopen 
because it was untimely and also denied the motion for an emergency stay 
of removal.71 
The court noted that it had jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of 
a motion to reopen unless 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) strips it of jurisdiction.72  
The court then looked to other circuits for guidance.73  The Third Circuit 
decided it would not dismiss the petition on the basis that it was filed two 
weeks prematurely based on the principle that in civil cases the court has 
held that “where there is no showing of prejudice by the adverse party and 
[the court] has not taken action on the merits of an appeal, a premature 
notice of appeal, filed after disposition of some of the claims before a 
district court, but before entry of final judgment, will ripen upon the 
court’s disposal of the remaining claims.”74 
The Third Circuit held that “so long as the Attorney General has not 
shown that he will suffer prejudice resulting from the premature filing of 
a petition for review, and we have yet to take action on the merits of the 
appeal, a premature petition for review can ripen once the BIA issues a 
                                                                                                             
 68 Khan, 691 F.3d at 491. 
 69 Id. at 492. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. (citing Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Congress has 
explicitly granted federal courts the power to review ‘any final order of removal’ under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Implicit in this jurisdictional grant is the authority to review the denial 
of a motion to reopen any such final order.”). 
 73 Khan, 691 F.3d at 492 (“There are differing views among our sister Courts of 
Appeals with regard to whether premature petitions for review can ripen upon a final 
decision by the BIA. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held that 
a premature petition for review does not ripen into a timely petition when the final order is 
eventually issued. Moreira v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 2007); Jaber v. 
Gonzales, 486 F.3d 223, 228–30 (6th Cir. 2007). The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, in contrast, has held that a premature petition can ripen provided that the BIA later 
orders the petitioner removed and the Attorney General has not shown that he would be 
prejudiced. Herrera-Molina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2010).”). 
 74 Khan, 691 F.3d at 493 (internal citations omitted). 
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final order on a motion to reopen.”75  The Third Circuit ultimately refused 
to treat premature petitions for review from final orders of removal 
differently from the way in which it has treated premature notices of 
appeal in other cases.76 
iii. Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit, in the same case where it decided that a final 
administrative removal order (“FARO”) is reviewable when issued,77 
concluded that it could review the noncitizen’s petition for review of the 
administrative removal order because reasonable fear proceedings were 
concluded during the pendency of the noncitizen’s petition and the 
government has shown no prejudice.78 
iv. Eleventh Circuit 
Like the Second and Third Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit faced a 
situation in which the petitioner filed a petition for review with the court 
of appeals before his immigration proceedings had concluded.79  After he 
was removed to Colombia, Mr. Jimenez-Morales “unsuccessfully tried to 
re-enter the United States without authorization near Hidalgo, Texas.”80  
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) took Mr. Jimenez-
Morales into custody and “administratively reinstated his 2011 order of 
removal.”81  Mr. Jimenez-Morales was placed in a reasonable fear 
proceeding after expressing “concern that he would be harmed if returned 
to Colombia.”82  Before oral argument, an asylum officer found that the 
noncitizen “did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture if he 
                                                                                                             
 75 Khan, 691 F.3d at 494. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See G.S. v. Holder, 373 F. App’x 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2010) (“a FARO is not 
appealable to the BIA—review lies only with the courts of appeals. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1228(b)(3) (‘The Attorney General may not execute [a FARO] until 14 calendar days 
have passed from the date that such order was issued, unless waived by the alien, in order 
that the alien has an opportunity to apply for judicial review under section 1252 of this 
title.’); id. § 1252(a)(1), (a)(5) (final orders of removal are appealable to courts of 
appeals).”). 
 78 G.S., 373 F. App’x at 843 (as the final administrative removal order was itself 
“final,” and there being no express prohibition against the ripening of a premature petition 
for review, “a petition for review filed after a FARO has issued but before an alien has 
completed the reasonable-fear process ripens upon completion of that process, provided 
the government has shown no prejudice arising from the timing of the petition.”). 
 79 Jimenez-Morales v. United States Att’y Gen., 821 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id.  A reasonable fear proceeding is available if in the course of the administrative 
removal or reinstatement process, the noncitizen expresses fear of returning to the country 
of removal.  8 U.S.C. § 208.31(a). 
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were removed to Colombia,” and an “immigration judge ratified the 
asylum officer’s finding.”83 
The Eleventh Circuit first considered whether it had jurisdiction over 
the noncitizen’s petition because the DHS’s reinstatement of the 2011 
order of removal was not “final” since the reasonable fear proceeding was 
ongoing.84  The court noted that the noncitizen’s premature appeal 
“presents a jurisdictional problem because the Immigration and 
Nationality Act vests circuit courts with jurisdiction to review only ‘final’ 
orders of removal.”85  The court agreed with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits 
that, “where a noncitizen pursues a reasonable fear proceeding following 
DHS’s initial reinstatement of a prior order of removal, the reinstated 
removal order does not become final until the reasonable fear proceeding 
is completed.”86  Thus, the court held it did not have jurisdiction when Mr. 
Jimenez-Morales filed his petition for review.87 
Nonetheless, the court went on to consider whether the petition 
ripened when the “immigration judge found that Mr. Jimenez-Morales did 
not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, had no basis for 
withholding of removal, and could not obtain relief under the CAT.”88  The 
court held that the petition for review ripened at the conclusion of the 
reasonable fear proceeding and that the court had jurisdiction to review 
it.89  The court sided with the Second and Third Circuits because “their 
approach is consistent with how we have addressed premature appeals in 
other contexts.”90  The court reasoned that this case is similar to cases 
where a premature notice of appeal is filed from an order dismissing a 
claim or party, and in those cases the premature notice of appeal is valid if 
followed by a subsequent final judgment.91  Therefore, the court concluded 
that it had jurisdiction to consider the noncitizen’s petition.92 
In conclusion, the Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have 
jurisdiction over premature petitions for review upon the adjudication of 
                                                                                                             
 83 Id. at 1307–08 (“The immigration judge found that Mr. Jimenez-Morales did not 
have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, that he had no basis for withholding of 
removal, and that he could not obtain relief under the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.18. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(g)(1), no further administrative appeal was 
available to Mr. Jimenez-Morales from the immigration judge’s decision.”). 
 84 Id. at 1308. 
 85 Jimenez-Morales, 821 F.3d at 1308.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 
 86 Id. at 1308. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 1309 (stating that a premature notice of appeal is valid if it is filed from an 
order dismissing a claim or party, and is followed by a subsequent final judgment, even 
without a new notice of appeal being filed) (internal citations omitted). 
 91 Jimenez-Morales, 821 F.3d at 1309. 
 92 Id. 
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the remaining applications for relief and protection, provided that the 
Attorney General has not shown prejudice. 
B. Circuits Where a Premature Petition for Review May Not Ripen for 
Judicial Review 
The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have concluded that a premature 
petition for review may not ripen into a properly filed petition based on 
the principle that finality is a jurisdictional prerequisite to review.93 
i. Fifth Circuit 
In Moreira v. Mukasey, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
filed a Notice to Appeal, alleging that Mr. Moreira was “subject to removal 
under § 1227 because he had been convicted of two crimes involving 
moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal 
misconduct.”94  The immigration judge ordered removal, rejecting Mr. 
Moreira’s “contention that his offenses failed to qualify as crimes of moral 
turpitude.”95  Mr. Moreira “filed a timely pro se notice of appeal to the 
BIA,” and “the BIA affirmed the decision of the immigration judge and 
dismissed Mr. Moreira’s appeal.”96  Mr. Moreira then “filed a motion for 
reconsideration and to reopen the BIA’s decision dismissing his appeal of 
the immigration judge’s order.”97  However, the BIA denied this motion.98  
Mr. Moreira then “filed a second motion to reopen and reconsider,” which 
the BIA also denied.99  “While his appeal to the BIA was pending,” Mr. 
Moreira “filed a habeas corpus petition in the District of Connecticut.”100 
The Fifth Circuit addressed whether it had “jurisdiction to consider 
Mr. Moreira’s challenges to the immigration judge’s order of removal and 
the BIA’s affirmance of that order.”101  The court noted that “the passage 
of the REAL ID Act divested district courts of jurisdiction over removal 
orders and designated the courts of appeals as the sole forums for such 
challenges via petitions for review.”102  The government argued that the 
                                                                                                             
 93 Moreira v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 709, 713–14 (5th Cir. 2007); see Jaber v. Gonzales, 
486 F.3d 223, 228–30 (6th Cir. 2007) (dismissing a case where review was sought from 
the immigration judge’s decision, but no petition for review was filed after the Board 
finally disposed of the case); Brion v. INS, 51 F. App’x 732, 733 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Chu v. INS, 875 F.2d 777, 780, 781 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
 94 Moreira, 509 F.3d at 711. 
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 96 Id. 
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 100 Moreira, 509 F.3d at 711. 
 101 Id. at 712. 
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court lacked jurisdiction because “Mr. Moreira’s appeal of the 
immigration judge’s removal order was pending at the time he filed his 
habeas petition.103  The government also argued that the noncitizen’s 
petition should be dismissed because he “had not exhausted his 
administrative remedies as required by § 1252(d)(1).”104 
The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Moreira’s 
petition.105  With regard to the noncitizen’s challenge of the immigration 
judge’s order of removal, the court lacked “jurisdiction to review the 
immigration judge’s decision independently.”106  The court found that “at 
the time that Mr. Moreira filed his petition for review, there was no final 
order that would permit it to review the order of deportation.”107  The Fifth 
Circuit followed the approaches taken by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in 
holding that “because there was no final order of removal to review, the 
court lacked jurisdiction at the time Mr. Moreira’s petition was filed” and 
that the “BIA’s later dismissal of Mr. Moreira’s appeal could not cure this 
jurisdictional defect.”108 
ii. Sixth Circuit 
In Jaber v. Gonzales, the petitioner “entered the United States on an 
immigrant visa as the spouse of a United States citizen with the status of a 
conditional permanent resident.”109  After the marriage was annulled, “the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service served Mr. Jaber with notice that 
it intended to terminate his conditional permanent resident status” on the 
basis of this annulment.110  Mr. Jaber responded by filing a petition 
requesting “a waiver of the requirement that he and his wife file a joint 
petition for permanent residence.”111  Thereafter, Mr. Jaber married 
another U.S. citizen who filed a Petition for Alien Relative (“Form I-130”) 
so that he could apply for a visa.112  Mr. Jaber “filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus in federal district court” while his appeal to the BIA was 
pending.113 
The Sixth Circuit held it did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Jaber’s 
petition; although he “sought BIA review of the immigration judge’s 
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denial of his motions to reopen,” “the BIA did not issue its decision until 
after Mr. Jaber filed his habeas petition in the district court and after the 
district court transferred the case” to the Sixth Circuit.114  The court relied 
on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), holding that “a party must file a petition for 
review with the court of appeals within 30 days.”115 
iii. Ninth Circuit 
In Abdisalan v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit held in its unanimous en 
banc opinion that when the Board issues a decision that denies relief in 
part, but remands other claims to an immigration judge for further 
proceedings, the agency decision is not a final reviewable order of removal 
and “does not trigger the thirty-day window in which to file a petition for 
review.”116 
The Ninth Circuit “adopted a straightforward rule: when the BIA 
issues a decision that denies some claims but remands any other claims for 
relief to an immigration judge for further proceedings (a ‘mixed’ decision), 
the BIA decision is not a final order of removal with regard to any of the 
claims, and it does not trigger the thirty-day window in which to file a 
petition for review.”117  Rather, a noncitizen should only seek judicial 
review at the conclusion of the proceedings, after either the immigration 
judge has issued a decision and the time for filing an administrative appeal 
has passed, or the BIA has issued a final decision after appeal from the 
immigration judge’s decision.118  Therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction 
over any petition for review filed prior to the conclusion of the 
proceedings.119 
In rendering its decision, the court recognized that the “point at 
which a removal order becomes final is critical for the purposes of timely 
petitioning for judicial review.”120  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit was 
concerned about the injustice that could arise because of the inconsistency 
in its jurisprudence regarding “mixed” decisions.121  The court recognized 
that “finality is less obvious when the Board affirms the denial of relief on 
some of an alien’s claims but remands to the immigration judge for further 
proceedings on others in a ‘mixed’ decision.”122 
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The court relied on the statutory text to “indicate that an order of 
removal cannot become final for any purpose when it depends on the 
resolution of further issues by the immigration judge on remand.”123  First, 
in defining finality for purposes of judicial review, the court reviewed 8 
U.S.C. § 1252, which states that the court has jurisdiction to review “a 
final order of removal.”124  The court relied on the definition of “order of 
removal” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A), where Congress 
defined an order of removal as “the order” of the immigration judge 
“concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.”125  “The 
order [] becomes “final upon the earlier of (i) a determination by the Board 
[] affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the 
alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board.”126 
Next, the court examined “the INA’s repeated reference to ‘the’ 
order” and concluded that those references “suggest that Congress 
contemplated that an alien’s removal proceedings would typically 
culminate in one final order of removal.”127  Thus, since there is only one 
final order of removal, the court found it “difficult to conceive how the 
order could become final at multiple points in time.”128  In support of this 
reading of the statute, the court relied on the plain meaning of the word 
“final,” and its common definition, as well as Congress’s use of the 
familiar term to conclude that Congress could not have “intend[ed] for an 
order of removal to become final while remanded proceedings remained 
ongoing.”129 
In conclusion, the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits concluded that a 
premature petition for review cannot ripen into a properly filed petition 
because the INA provides jurisdiction to review only final orders of 
removal, and that finality is a jurisdictional prerequisite to review.  
Therefore, the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits will not review premature 
petitions under any circumstances. 
IV. THE INA’S AMBIGUOUS JUDICIAL REVIEW PROVISIONS 
CREATE CONFUSION 
To promote justice, premature petitions for review should ripen into 
reviewable orders upon disposal of all claims and absent prejudice to the 
government.  The lack of access to judicial review of final orders of 
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removal deprives noncitizens of their due process rights and often results 
in noncitizens with valid claims being deported to dangerous countries.130  
The INA’s obscure language regarding the availability of judicial review 
of undefined “final” orders of removal creates confusion.  The current 
confusion and conflict among the circuits not only wastes judicial 
resources, but also serves to deprive noncitizens of judicial review.  In 
light of the current circuit split, noncitizens will likely receive more 
favorable results if their premature petitions are filed in the Second, Third, 
Tenth or Eleventh Circuits.  In contrast, if the premature petition is filed 
in the Fifth, Sixth, or Ninth Circuits, the noncitizen will be left with no 
recourse and likely forced to return to his/her country and endure the 
hardships and dangerous conditions he/she was fleeing from in the first 
place. 
The rule applied by the Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits 
is the fairer and more efficient rule.  Under this standard, absent a showing 
of prejudice to the adverse party, a noncitizen’s premature petition for 
review will ripen into a reviewable order upon disposal of all claims.131  
This rule promotes fairness and advances principles of due process as it 
provides noncitizens with the opportunity to have their case heard by an 
impartial decision maker.  Furthermore, it allows the agency to complete 
its proceedings without premature interference from the courts and 
provides noncitizens with essential, clear guidance about the proper time 
in which to file a petition for review.  Indeed, orders of removal require 
strict judicial review as the result of such an order will drastically impact 
the welfare and future of the noncitizen and his family. 
The INA’s judicial review provisions leave the critical detail of 
“finality” undefined.  Such inadequacy ultimately has resulted in 
uncertainty as to when a petition for review may be filed, and in some 
unfortunate cases, the loss of the noncitizen’s opportunity for judicial 
review.  It is well established that constitutional protections extend to 
noncitizens within the United States’ geographic borders.132  Pursuant to 
the Fifth Amendment, no person—including noncitizens—shall be 
                                                                                                             
 130 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 543, 546 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893)) 
(Noncitizens are “persons” entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause of the 
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 131 See Jimenez-Morales, 821 F.3d at 1308–09; Khan, 691 F.3d at 493; Herrera-
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deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”133  As 
such, noncitizens, like United States citizens, are entitled to have their 
orders of removal reviewed by an impartial decision maker.  Because 
noncitizens are not versed with the laws of the United States or judicial 
procedure, the courts of appeals must adopt a uniform standard that 
outlines the requirements for review of petitions to soothe the confusion 
and promote the due process rights and liberties detailed in the 
Constitution. 
Critics of judicial review in immigration cases believe that judicial 
review is a tactic to delay deportation.134  However, this criticism ignores 
the fact that some delays are necessary to preserve the values of our 
constitution and to correct injustice done at the administrative level.  
Proponents of judicial review have argued that “judicial review is a key to 
success for improvement of the immigration adjudication system” because 
it ”helps to boost immigration esteem,” “is essential to a more efficient 
system,” and “increases the legitimacy of the entire adjudication 
system.”135  Strict judicial review is essential in immigration cases because 
the stakes are high for vulnerable noncitizens and the federal courts of 
appeals are in a superior position to simplify immigration law and set 
precedent which allows noncitizens every opportunity to have their case 
heard by an impartial decision maker.  Indeed, federal judges have 
critiqued immigration court decisions because of the lack of quality and, 
at times, injustice.136  The importance of judicial review is amplified in the 
context of removal hearings due to the highly punitive nature of 
deportation.  Certainly, a clear standard of judicial review promotes justice 
and provides that judiciary resources are efficiently used in cases where 
all administrative remedies have been exhausted. 
V. PROPOSAL FOR EXPANDING JUDICIAL REVIEW IN IMMIGRATION 
The rule adopted by the Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits 
which permits the courts of appeals to review premature petitions absent a 
showing of prejudice to the adverse party safeguards the interests of 
noncitizens and is the most efficient rule.  This rule avoids unnecessary 
piecemeal litigation, allows the agency to complete its proceedings 
without premature interference from the courts, and provides noncitizens 
with clear guidance about the proper time to file a petition for review.  
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Additionally, a universal interpretation of the INA provisions would 
preserve a fair opportunity for noncitizens to seek judicial review of final 
orders of removal.  Judicial review is essential in cases involving final 
orders of removal because of the punitive nature of removal from the 
United States.  For noncitizens in removal proceedings, the stakes could 
hardly be higher.  Noncitizens face the prospect of being forced from the 
country they call home—leaving behind friends, family, and loved ones—
and being deported to a country where they may fear imprisonment, 
torture, and even death.137 
Because noncitizens are required to exhaust administrative remedies 
prior to seeking judicial review, it is imperative that the courts adopt a 
universal interpretation of the INA language regarding the finality of an 
order of removal to safeguard the interests of noncitizens and the judiciary.  
It is well established that “the presence of a final agency action is 
important in order to, inter alia, ‘provide[] the agency with every 
reasonable opportunity to resolve the matter by using its special 
expertise.’”138  As such, the INA provisions must detail when the agency 
action is complete so that there is guidance as to when noncitizens may 
seek federal judicial review of an order of removal. 
One proposal is for the courts of appeal to adopt a bright-line rule 
dictating when judicial review could be sought.  “A bright-line rule 
ensures that noncitizens are on clear notice of when they must file their 
petition for review, thus guarding against a missed filing deadline.”139  A 
uniform interpretation of “final order of removal” will minimize costs 
associated with seeking judicial review and ensure that judicial review is 
only used when the agency has finally decided all issues.140  Certainly, the 
circuit court’s immigration docket will be reduced if there is a universal 
rule that specifies when an order is “final” so that a noncitizen may seek 
judicial review.  Such a rule will ease the burden on the courts of appeals 
                                                                                                             
 137 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (deportation is a “drastic 
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dockets because noncitizens will be on clear notice as to when to file a 
petition for review, thus eliminating the need for the courts to evaluate 
petitions which have not matured for purposes of jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court can step in and resolve the circuit split by 
interpreting the INA provisions dealing with final orders of removal.  The 
Supreme Court should adopt the reasoning of the Second, Third, Tenth 
and Eleventh Circuits which allow the courts of appeals to review 
premature petitions absent a showing of prejudice to the adverse party.  
This interpretation clarifies when a noncitizen should file a petition for 
review and safeguards the constitutional rights of noncitizens.  Indeed, the 
United States Supreme Court has held that practical, not technical, 
considerations are to govern the application of principles of finality.141  
The standard followed by the Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits 
not only provides clarity, but it is fair and efficient.142  Under this 
approach, the courts participate in a burden-benefit analysis in considering 
premature petitions.143  Under this standard, if there is no showing of 
prejudice by the Attorney General and the court has not acted on the merits 
of an appeal, a premature notice of appeal will ripen into a reviewable 
order upon the immigration court’s disposal of the remaining claims.144  
Thus, the standard followed by the Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits effectively preserves the rights of noncitizens to seek judicial 
review.  This impartial interpretation of the INA is necessary to protect the 
rights of noncitizens who are already vulnerable and intimidated by the 
lengthy and uncertain process to obtain lawful status and avoid removal. 
Congress could, as well, step in and resolve the problem by enacting 
a clear definition of what constitutes a final order of removal for purposes 
of judicial review.  In accordance with the decisions of the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Ninth Circuits, Congress can enact a universal rule that “finality, for 
purposes of judicial review, does not exist so long as any determination of 
removability or application for relief remains to be decided by the 
agency.”145  The addition of a finality definition into 8 U.S.C. § 1252, 
which governs judicial review of orders of removal, provides the benefit 
                                                                                                             
 141 Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1949). 
 142 See Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d at 132 (holding that a premature petition for review 
“can become a reviewable final order upon the adjudication of remaining applications for 
relief and protection, provided that the Attorney General has not shown prejudice”); Khan, 
691 F.3d at 494 (holding that if “the Attorney General has not shown that he will suffer 
prejudice resulting from the premature filing of a petition for review,” “a premature petition 
for review can ripen once the BIA issues a final order”); Jimenez-Morales, 821 F.3d at 
1308 (holding that the noncitizen’s petition ripened when the immigration judge found that 
the noncitizen “did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture”). 
 143 Id. 
 144 See Khan, 691 F.3d at 494. 
 145 Carlson, supra note 7, at 685. 
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of clarity and eases the noncitizen’s burden of applying for judicial 
review.146  The following language, proposed by Jesi J. Carlson, Patrick J. 
Glen and Kohsei Ugumori naturally fits into 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), and 
clearly provides that judicial review would be premature until all agency 
proceedings are completed: 
(2) Finality 
(A) An order of removal entered under 8 U.S.C.§§1228, 1229a, and 
1231(a)(5), is not final for purposes of judicial review unless (i) 
removability has been finally determined and (ii) all applications for relief 
and protection and other administrative matters, including but not limited 
to asylum, withholding of removal, cancellation of removal, adjustment of 
status, voluntary departure, background checks, and designation of 
country of removal, have been resolved by the Board, an immigration 
judge, or other immigration official charged with resolving such 
application or matter. 
(B) The filing of any applications for relief or protection from 
removal following entry of the final order of removal shall not affect the 
finality of such order. 
(C) An order denying reopening or reconsideration becomes a final 
order of removal upon entry of the order by the Board or, if denied by the 
immigration judge, when such order becomes final pursuant to 
regulation.147 
The proposed language allows the agency to complete its 
proceedings without premature interference from the courts and provides 
noncitizens with clear guidance about the proper time to file a petition for 
review.  A universal interpretation or rule that an order of removal is not 
“final” until all administrative proceedings have concluded, irrespective 
of remands or voluntary departures is supported by the statutory and 
regulatory language and administrative precedent.  This universal rule 
would also preserve a fair opportunity for noncitizens to seek judicial 
review of final orders of removal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The vagueness in the Immigration and Nationality Act judicial 
review provisions has left many noncitizens without any recourse from 
removal orders.  Many noncitizens are deported to countries full of 
violence and turmoil because of the INA’s lack of clarity as to when an 
order of removal is final for purposes of judicial review.148  This confusion 
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 147 Id. at 684. 
 148 In 2015, a total of 333,341 noncitizens were removed compared to 407,075 in 2014.  
See Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (2015) 
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is evidenced in the diverging circuit decisions regarding premature 
petitions for review.149  The time is ripe for the courts of appeals to adopt 
a uniform standard of review for premature petitions for review to resolve 
the confusion and promote the due process rights and liberties detailed in 
the Constitution. 
The standard followed by the Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits preserves a fair opportunity for noncitizens to seek judicial review 
of final orders of removal and provides clarity as to when judicial review 
is available.  It is also the fairest and most efficient rule.  Under this 
standard, if there is no showing of prejudice by the adverse party and the 
court of appeals has not acted on the merits of an appeal, a premature 
notice of appeal will ripen into a reviewable order upon the BIA or 
immigration court’s disposal of the remaining claims.150  This rule 
guarantees that noncitizens are on clear notice of when they must file their 
petition for review and preserves the resources of the judiciary so that 
judicial review is only used when the agency has finally decided all issues.  
Lastly, a uniform rule advances the values detailed in the United States 
Constitution. 
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